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Background: In the case of a pandemic, individuals may alter their behaviour. A dynamic model incorporating
social distancing can provide a mechanism to consider complex scenarios to support decisions regarding antiviral
stockpile size while considering uncertainty around behavioural interventions. We have examined the impact of
social distancing measures on the demand for limited healthcare resources such as antiviral drugs from a central
stockpile during a severe pandemic.
Methods: We used an existing age-structured model for pandemic influenza in Canada and biologically plausible
scenarios for severe influenza transmission within the population. We incorporated data from published reports
regarding stated intentions to change behaviour during a pandemic as well as the magnitude and duration of time
that individuals expected to maintain the behavioural change. We ran simulations for all combinations of parameter
values to identify the projected antiviral requirements in each scenario.
Results: With 12 weeks of distancing, the effect is relatively small for the lowest R0 of 1.6 with a projected stockpile
to treat 25.6% being required (IQR = 21.7 – 28.7%) unless the proportion of people involved (81%) and magnitude
of the behaviour change is large (69% reduction in contacts). If 24 weeks of distancing occurs, with only a low to
moderate reduction in contacts (38% or less), it is not possible to bring treatment requirements below 20%
regardless of what proportion of the population engages in distancing measures when transmissibility is high
(R0 = 2.0; stockpile size = 31%, IQR = 29.2 – 33.5%).
Conclusions: Our results demonstrate that the magnitude and duration of social distancing behaviours during a
severe pandemic have an impact on the need for antiviral drugs. However, significant investments over a long
period of time (>16 weeks) are required to decrease the need for antiviral treatment to below 10% of the total
population for a highly transmissible viral strain (R0 > 1.8). Encouraging individuals to adopt behaviours that
decrease their daily contact rate can help to control the spread of the virus until a vaccine becomes available
however; relying on these measures to justify stockpiling fewer courses of treatment will not be sufficient in the
case of a severe pandemic.
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During an infectious disease outbreak, individuals may
change their behaviour in an attempt to protect them-
selves from becoming infected. Behaviour change is
driven by individual perceptions of risk associated with
activities such as using public transit or attending public
gatherings and may also be influenced by media re-
porting [1,2]. Changes in behaviour that result in indi-
viduals making fewer contacts over the course of a day
than would have been the case prior to the behaviour
change is one form of social distancing that might occur
during a severe influenza pandemic. We define a severe
pandemic as one where the new influenza virus trans-
mits easily in the population and causes significant mor-
bidity and mortality.
Non-pharmaceutical public health measures deployed
during a pandemic focus on behavioural changes within
the population. There has been significant interest in
understanding how these changes can influence the pro-
jected outcomes of disease transmission models for pan-
demic influenza [3]. Formal non-pharmaceutical public
health measures instituted by public health officials such
as school closure decrease the number of contacts be-
tween school-aged children. There have been a variety of
models that have examined the impact of different
school closure strategies on pandemic disease transmis-
sion [4-9]. Models that examine the potential impact of
multiple public health interventions in combination (e.g.
pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical interventions)
also typically include formal social distancing measures
such as school closures [10-12]. Informal social distan-
cing measures such as individual level behaviour change
in response to the perceived risk of infection while going
about daily activities by changing work routines, or ad-
justing modes of transportation is another way in which
disease transmission during a pandemic may be buff-
ered. More recent models have laid out a general frame-
work for considering this type of informal, dynamic and
adaptive behaviour change in models of disease trans-
mission [13-18].
The Canadian government maintains a National Anti-
viral Stockpile (NAS) in case of an influenza pandemic.
Stockpiled drugs are for the direct care of infected pa-
tients and not prophylaxis [19]. Before the occurrence of
the 2009 influenza A/H1N1 pandemic, Canada used a
number of static planning assumptions resulting in plans
that were based on an anticipated clinical attack rate of
15-35% [19] resulting in a stockpile that contains enough
antivirals to treat 17.5% of the Canadian population.
Models that incorporate both social distancing measures
and antiviral treatment have primarily examined how to
optimally allocate an antiviral stockpile of a pre-defined
size using different strategies [20-24]. Alternatively,
Kelso et al. [25] have examined how different policies forthe diagnosis and treatment of pandemic influenza im-
pact a finite antiviral stockpile over the course of a pan-
demic. To our knowledge, there are few dynamic models
that have been used to understand stockpile size require-
ments in the face of pandemic influenza uncertainty
[26].
We have examined the impact that social distancing
behaviour can have on the amount of antiviral treatment
required during a severe pandemic. Most developed
countries maintain a stockpile of antiviral drugs in the
case of a pandemic however, even the largest stockpile is
unlikely to contain enough treatment courses to treat
more than 20% of a population [19]. In the case of a
severe pandemic and in the absence of a sensitive point
of care test for pandemic influenza, stockpiles may not
be sufficient to meet antiviral demands. In developing
countries, where no stockpile exists, behaviour change
may be an even more important intervention for minim-
izing morbidity and mortality. If social distancing were
to become a common behaviour during a severe pan-
demic, one might expect that the disease burden in the
population and subsequent healthcare resource needs
such as reliance on an antiviral stockpile may be reduced
especially if population compliance is high until the
point at which a pandemic vaccine becomes available.
The optimal stockpile size will vary depending on the
characteristics of the pandemic virus and the care-
seeking behaviour of the population. Logistical cons-
traints such as warehousing and the expiry of drugs
before they are used are additional considerations.
Trade-offs are inevitable and stockpiling for the worst-
case scenario is highly cost-prohibitive. The possibility
that informal behavioural interventions that don’t rely
on school closures will reduce healthcare resource use
during a severe pandemic when resources such as an-
tivirals may become thinly stretched is an important
consideration for public health decision-makers and
pandemic planners. The objective of this model was to
evaluate to what extent it might be possible to rely on
informal behavioural changes to decrease antiviral treat-
ment needs during a severe pandemic so that less antivi-
rals would need to be held in the National stockpile.
Methods
Model structure
We used a previously published, deterministic, SEIR
compartmental model to address this research question
[27]. The model assumed that all Canadians were in one
of several, mutually exclusive health states. Individuals
could be susceptible to infection (S), or exposed but not
yet infectious to others (E). In addition, the previously
published model was modified to include three different
“Infected” compartments. Individuals could be asymp-
tomatically infected (IA), symptomatically infected but
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infected and treated with antivirals (IT). Lastly, individ-
uals could be recovered from their infection or removed
(R). We assumed that 40% of all infected individuals
were asymptomatic but that asymptomatic and symp-
tomatic individuals were equally infectious [8,28]. Popu-
lation data used was from the 2006 Canadian Census
[29]. The model simulated a 12 month period of model
time following the initial introduction of the pandemic
influenza strain to Canada.
Age structure
The model was age-structured (0–4, 5–13, 14–17,
18–23, 24–52, 53–64, 65+) and age-specific mixing pat-
terns were based on empirical data from Mossong et al.
[30]. The model was also structured to capture indivi-
duals with chronic, underlying medical conditions. The
proportion of each age group with at least one chronic
condition was estimated from the Canadian Community
Health Survey (CCHS) [31]. The model also included a
separate pregnant health state (P) that represented preg-
nant women. The population estimated to be in this state
at any given point in time was derived from Canadian
census data for pregnancies and live births [32,33]. Tran-
sitions between compartments were the same for all in-
dividuals (Table 1) regardless of chronic disease state or
pregnancy however; the probability of receiving vaccine








Duration of infection Se
Pre-existing immunity in individuals > years
Clinical characteristics
Proportion symptomatic 1
Proportion of symptomatic cases seeking medical attention 1
Vaccination




RRFSS – Rapid Risk Factor Surveillance System.
Attack rates are calculated as base case scenarios in the absence of any interventioPre-existing immunity
In the model, we assume that some proportion of indi-
viduals aged 53 and older may be immune to infection
by the circulating pandemic strain as a result of previous
exposure to a similar influenza strain as seen in past
pandemics [42-44]. These individuals are moved to the
R compartment at time zero. Simulations incorporated a
range of pre-existing immunity values from 0% to 40%
in 5% increments.
Influenza transmissibility, natural history and clinical
characteristics
We examined a range of basic reproductive numbers
(R0) [8,26,34-40,45]. All natural history parameters and
ranges examined in the model are outlined in Table 1
and the parameters have been examined in all possible
combinations.
Seasonality
Significant uncertainty exists regarding the time at which
a novel pandemic influenza strain may emerge and sub-
sequently spread in Canada. Influenza is not easily trans-
mitted during the northern hemisphere summer likely
due to changes in environmental factors (e.g. humidity)
which appear to act to decrease influenza transmission
[46-48]. Therefore, in scenarios where the introduction
of the virus occurs in the spring, the transmissibility of
the virus is decreased over the course of the summerdian antiviral stockpile model
train Value (range) Reference(s)
7/1958 1.6 (attack rate = 37%) [8,26,34-36]
8/1969 1.8 (attack rate = 41%) [8,26,34,35,37,38]
918 2.0 (attack rate = 45%) [8,26,34,35,39,40]
asonal 2.1 days [41]
asonal 4.8 days [41]
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factors become more conducive to influenza transmis-
sion (resulting in a relatively small first wave followed by
a larger second wave in the fall) [27]. In contrast, when
the introduction happens during the fall or winter sea-
son, a single large wave is typically seen. These different
time scales can significantly affect the observed impact
of an intervention strategy such as vaccination. To force
seasonality to align with the spring/fall wave pheno-
menon observed in the northern hemisphere in previous
pandemics [46,49], transmissibility was decreased from
July to early September. We included two scenarios: a
spring/fall scenario with two waves; and a fall/winter
scenario with one wave in either the late fall or winter.
See [27] for a more detailed description of the imple-
mentation of model seasonality.
Vaccination
We have projected antiviral demand in the presence of
vaccination. We assume that vaccine becomes available
6 months after viral emergence. This assumption is
based on our experience with vaccine production and
distribution capabilities during the 2009 pandemic. We
have assumed that it takes 6 weeks to roll out a pan-
demic vaccination program at the national level. Vaccine
efficacy in the model was 70% and it took 10 days for
vaccinated individuals to develop vaccine induced im-
munity [27]. Vaccine prioritization was as follows: 1)
pregnant women and all individuals with a chronic
underlying condition as defined by the CCHS (regardless
of age), 2) healthy children aged 0–4 and healthy adults
aged 65+, 3) healthy children aged 5–17, and 4) healthy
adults aged 18–64. We assume high vaccine coverage
levels as might be expected for a severe pandemic
(Table 1) [27].
Antivirals
In order to receive antivirals in the model, the individual
must seek treatment. We include a parameter that de-
scribes the proportion of symptomatic cases that seek
treatment which is essentially a surrogate for clinicalTable 2 Parameter values and assumptions for implementing
Social distancing parameters
Item Experience






Magnitude of behaviour change Percent redu
Start of social distancing behaviours Assu
Number of weeks that behaviour change is maintained Assu
Effect of age on behaviour change Assuseverity (Table 1). We assume that in the absence of a
point of care test, all individuals who present for treat-
ment with respiratory symptoms will be eligible to receive
antivirals. The model does not include the circulation of
other respiratory pathogen so antiviral allocation in the
model is for true pandemic cases and not non-influenza
cases. The model assumes that all treated individuals re-
ceive a 5 day course of antivirals [50]. In the model, anti-
viral treatment does not decrease transmission to others.
Social distancing
We have focused on social distancing that impacts the
contact rate between individuals in the population (e.g.
decreased contact rates = decreased opportunities for
influenza transmission). A variety of studies have exam-
ined the intention of people to engage in social distan-
cing measures should a severe pandemic occur and we
have used these findings to inform our model parame-
ters (Table 2). For the intervention levels that we exam-
ined, we did not include a parameter for the waning of
compliance over the investigated time period.
Results
In the absence of any behaviour change, our model
estimates that for a severe pandemic with significant
transmissibility (R0 = 2) and no amount of pre-existing
immunity in the population, 35.0% of the Canadian
population would require access to antivirals from the
national antiviral stockpile (IQR = 31.9 – 39.8%). In com-
parison, a similar pandemic with an R0 equal to 1.8 re-
sults in treatment of 32.8% (IQR = 29.0 – 36.7%) and a
pandemic with R0 equal to 1.6 results in treatment of
29.4% of the population (IQR = 26.4 – 32.4%).
The ability of social distancing measures to decrease
the number of Canadians requiring antiviral treatment
during a severe pandemic depends on the transmissibil-
ity of the virus, as well as the willingness, magnitude and
duration of distancing measures adopted by individuals.
With 12 weeks of social distancing the effect is relatively
small even for the lowest R0 of 1.6 (25.6%, IQR = 21.7 –
28.7%) unless the proportion of the population involvedsocial distancing into the model
Value (range examined) Reference
ed places 56% (31-81%) [1,2,51-55]
transportation
places
l / work arrangements
ction in contacts 38% (7 – 69%) [13]
mption 2 weeks after first imported case Assumption
mption 16 weeks (12 – 24 weeks) [53]
mption No effect [2,56]
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reduction in contacts) is large (1.4%, IQR = 0.7 – 2.7%)
(Figure 1). As the period of social distancing increases to
16 weeks, larger effects can be seen for RO = 1.6 even
when the proportion of the population involved is rela-
tively small (23.8%, IQR = 11.9 – 26.6%) (Figure 2). The
magnitude of the 16 week effect is most significant for
more moderate R0 values (<1.8) (Figure 2). For large R0
values (e.g. 2.0), only a significant investment in social
distancing can bring antiviral treatment requirements
below 20% (11.5%, IQR = 9.2 – 14.3%). If 24 weeks of
distancing occurs, with only a low to moderate reduction
in contacts (38% or less), it is not possible to bring
treatment requirements below 20% regardless of what
proportion of the population engages in distancing mea-
sures for high levels of transmissibility (R0 = 2.0; 31%,
IQR = 29.2 – 33.5%) (Figure 3). Social distancing mea-
sures that are maintained at a moderate to high level for
a long period of time (24 weeks) result in very little dis-
ease transmission regardless of transmissibility (R0) and
therefore antiviral demand from the stockpile is very low
(0.006%, IQR = 0.004 – 0.03%) however, the economic
impact of such strict measures make a 6 month period
of high compliance unlikely (Figure 3).
Discussion
Our results demonstrate that the impact of social distan-
cing measures on the number of Canadians requiring
antiviral treatment during a severe pandemic dependsReduction
31% participation 56% pa
12 we
Figure 1 The median (line within the shaded box), 25th and 75th perc
lower adjacent values (error bars) proportion of the Canadian popula
severe pandemic as a function of viral transmissibility and the magni
9 individual simulation runs using a range of pre-existing immunity values
uptake where between 31% and 81% of the Canadian population engages
change ranged from only a 7% reduction in contacts to a 69% reduction inon the transmissibility of the virus, as well as the willing-
ness, magnitude and duration of distancing measures
adopted by individuals in the population. We have
shown that although informal social distancing measures
can reduce the need for antiviral treatment dispensed
from a centrally held stockpile, if the pandemic strain
were highly transmissible, stockpiles in excess of 20%
population coverage could still be required even in the
presence of significant behavioural change. Public health
planners struggle with the costs and logistics of stockpil-
ing large amounts of treatment. The idea that stockpil-
ing fewer doses and relying on informal social distancing
measures in the case of a severe pandemic to decrease
demand for the stockpile until vaccine becomes available
seems reasonable. However, our results indicate that in-
formal distancing does not actually decrease demand
enough to warrant only a small stockpile unless the dur-
ation and magnitude of the intervention was sustained
for long periods of time with high compliance. Although
the main outcome of the model is the quantity of anti-
viral drugs required from the stockpile to treat pandemic
cases, it is also a measure of the use of any health care
resources that occur proportionally to the rate at which
individuals seek medical attention and could be consid-
ered a proxy measure for a variety of healthcare resources
that may be in limited supply during a pandemic.
If the duration of behaviour change adopted by the
population is maintained for 12 weeks, the impact on
the consumption of antivirals is relatively small with a in Contacts
rticipation 81% participation
eks
entile values (top and bottom of shaded box), and upper and
tion expected to require antiviral treatment (Y-axis) during a
tude of change maintained for 12 weeks. Each box represents
from 0-40%. We examined three different levels of behaviour change
in social distancing behaviour. The magnitude of the behaviour
contacts for all scenarios.
Reduction in Contacts
31% participation 56% participation 81% participation
16 weeks
Figure 2 The median (line within the shaded box), 25th and 75th percentile values (top and bottom of shaded box), and upper and
lower adjacent values (error bars) proportion of the Canadian population expected to require antiviral treatment (Y-axis) during a
severe pandemic as a function of viral transmissibility and the magnitude of change maintained for 16 weeks. Each box represents
9 individual simulation runs using a range of pre-existing immunity values from 0-40%. We examined three different levels of behaviour change
uptake where between 31% and 81% of the Canadian population engages in social distancing behaviour. The magnitude of the behaviour
change ranged from only a 7% reduction in contacts to a 69% reduction in contacts for all scenarios.
Reduction in Contacts
31% participation 56% participation 81% participation
24 weeks
Figure 3 The median (line within the shaded box), 25th and 75th percentile values (top and bottom of shaded box), and upper and
lower adjacent values (error bars) proportion of the Canadian population expected to require antiviral treatment (Y-axis) during a
severe pandemic as a function of viral transmissibility and the magnitude of change maintained for 24 weeks. Each box represents
9 individual simulation runs using a range of pre-existing immunity values from 0-40%. We examined three different levels of behaviour change
uptake where between 31% and 81% of the Canadian population engages in social distancing behaviour. The magnitude of the behaviour
change ranged from only a 7% reduction in contacts to a 69% reduction in contacts for all scenarios.
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requiring antivirals from the stockpile. This might be
expected in a pandemic where initial media reports
highlight the unknown nature of the emerging threat
causing fear and panic in the population. However, sig-
nificant uncertainty exists around the likelihood that
compliance would remain high over the course of the
12 weeks. As the situation evolves, people may relax the
behavioural changes they had previously implemented
if they feel that their risk of infection has decreased
[2,57]. Behavioural changes lasting significantly less than
12 weeks are unlikely to have enough of an impact to re-
duce the need for antivirals from the stockpile which is a
finding that is in line with the results of Maharaj and
Kleczkowski [15]. Maharaj and Kleczkowski demon-
strated that if the disease is highly infectious, social dis-
tancing cannot be relied upon to control the epidemic
and any social distancing that does occur would have to
be extreme in order to have any effect [15].
The duration of time that distancing measures are in
place has important implications for the economic sta-
bility of a country. In some cases, individuals may be
able to change their contact patterns easily for example,
by arranging to work from home. However, for indi-
viduals who work in an industry that provides critical
infrastructure, significantly altering work related con-
tact patterns is likely not a possibility especially if the
behaviour change needed to be implemented for up to
6 months. Compliance fatigue would likely play a signifi-
cant role regardless of if the social distancing were to be
maintained for 12 or 24 weeks.
Even though we have assumed high levels of vaccine
uptake in the population, vaccination has only a small
impact on the overall antiviral stockpile need in the
population because of the time at which we assume vac-
cine becomes available (Table 1). This is especially rele-
vant during a severe pandemic as a virus with a higher
R0 value will spread very rapidly and infect many indi-
viduals before vaccine becomes available even if vaccine
could be produced more quickly. For both in-season
and out of season emergence, the 6 month time
frame for vaccine availability means that a large num-
ber of Canadians will be infected before vaccine is
available to them. Reducing the timeframe from viral
emergence to vaccine availability would further de-
crease the demand for antiviral treatment.
Our results are in contrast with a UK study examining
antiviral stockpiling. A 2005 study by Gani et al. [26]
which modelled antiviral treatment requirements in the
UK population suggested that a stockpile size of 12%
would be sufficient to treat pandemic cases even if the
overall attack rate in the absence of intervention was 25%.
However, in this study, the authors assume that treated
individuals have a shortened duration of infectiousnesswhich significantly reduces the effective reproductive
number as more and more individuals are treated. How-
ever, empirical evidence suggests that this is likely only the
case if treatment is started within 48 hours of symptom
onset [58]. Recent analyses of the 2009 influenza pan-
demic indicates that in at least one geographic region of
Canada, the vast majority of patients receiving antivirals
received them > 48 hours after symptom onset [59]. In this
case, the effect on subsequent transmission would be neg-
ligible and the proposed 12% recommendation would be
an underestimate because of suboptimal antiviral treat-
ment timing.
Limitations
We have not explicitly considered school closure in any
of these scenarios nor have we considered behavioural
changes such as hand hygiene or coughing into your
sleeve as the impact of these at a population level is dif-
ficult to quantify. We assume a constant level of behav-
iour change over some duration of time which is likely
unrealistic. Some individuals may fatigue such that the
magnitude of their behaviour change wanes over time.
Others may react to external factors such as media re-
ports and may increase or decrease the magnitude of
their social distancing measures over time based on their
perception of risk. A variety of studies have examined
the intention of people to engage in social distancing
measures should a severe pandemic occur and those are
the studies we have used to inform this work. The re-
sults of these studies vary significantly especially by
geography. For example, Asian populations that ex-
perienced SARS tend to respond at higher levels than
European populations [51]. Also, there is evidence that
the way in which people respond in practice often differs
from their response if asked about their “intention” (e.g.
healthcare workers intention to vaccinate for seasonal
influenza vs. actual vaccination rates) [60,61]. Our model
does not provide specific advice for how to distribute
the antiviral stockpile. It is possible that in the case of a
severe pandemic, stockpiles could be used up relatively
quickly. In this case, some of the stockpile should be
reserved for treatment of hospitalized cases and other
vulnerable groups. Targeted antiviral use in this context
would likely be much more effective at preventing
deaths per dose however; our model has not specifically
examined strategies for optimal deployment or manage-
ment of a stockpile. The model does not consider the
possibility of reduced transmission due to antiviral treat-
ment. There is evidence that individuals who receive
treatment within 48 hours of symptom onset are less in-
fectious to others [62]. However, it is unclear what pro-
portion of cases would actually begin treatment within
this 48 hour window. During the 2009 H1N1 influenza
pandemic in Canada, many cases received antiviral
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ment does decrease influenza transmission by making
treated individuals less infectious to others this could
lead to a lower population attack rate, and in turn to
lower antiviral usage than we project here [25,62]. We
have also not considered antiviral wastage due to the
presence of other co-circulating respiratory pathogens
although this is an area that has important implications
for stockpiling and is an area of ongoing research.
Conclusions
Using an age-structured model of pandemic influenza
transmission in the Canadian population, we have dem-
onstrated that the magnitude and duration of social dis-
tancing behaviours adopted by the population during a
severe pandemic can have a significant impact on the
overall need for antiviral drugs. Although it is tempting
to assume that in the case of a severe pandemic, infor-
mal social distancing will be enough to buffer com-
munity transmission until a safe and effective vaccine
becomes available our results indicate that for a large
number of scenarios, this is not a reasonable assump-
tion. Although the cost of stockpiling antiviral treatment
is substantial, relying on behaviour change to justify scal-
ing back stockpiles is not supported by the evidence. For
many scenarios simulating a severe influenza pandemic
(with R0 > 1.6) and including different levels of social
distancing, the demand for antivirals from a central
stockpile still exceeds 20%. Stockpiling enough antivirals
to treat >20% of the Canadian population as our model
suggests could be the case in a severe pandemic is un-
realistic from both a monetary and logistical point of
view especially since there is no way to predict the prob-
ability that the next pandemic will be severe. In this
case, mechanisms to decrease reliance on a finite stock-
pile of antivirals for treatment should focus on targeted
and strategic use of antivirals in specific high risk popu-
lations and investment in novel technologies which may
result in the ability to produce and distribute a safe and
effective pandemic vaccine in less than 6 months. En-
couraging individuals to adopt behaviours that decrease
their contact rate can help to control the spread of the
virus until a vaccine becomes available however; social
distancing is unable to have enough of an impact to jus-
tify stockpiling fewer courses of antiviral treatment.
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